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INTRODUCTION TO PATENT EXHAUSTION

I. INTRODUCTION TO PATENT EXHAUSTION

Patent owners are always looking for ways to maximize their
patent's potential. Many patent owners often go to great lengths to
ensure that they can enforce their patent rights by exercising
downstream control of their patented items in the marketplace. This can
be accomplished many ways, such as through post-sale restrictions and
conditional licenses. However, the patent exhaustion doctrine remains
one of the strongest ways to determine what users can do with the
intellectual property that they have obtained.' Specifically, the patent
* Jonathan Werner is a J.D. Candidate at the University of Florida Levin College of
Law, 2011; M.S.E., University of Pennsylvania, 2005; B.S. & B.A., Rutgers University, 2004.
This Note is dedicated to the loving memory of my father, Dr. Robert H. Werner, who always
provided me with the best guidance and support.
1. See MARTIN ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 799 (3rd ed.
Thomson Reuters 2009) (1998).
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exhaustion doctrine governs limitations on a patent owner's ability to
enforce control rights on a patented invention once it has been
transferred to another party. Recent Supreme Court rationale has
acknowledged the usefulness of the patent exhaustion doctrine by
adopting a broad view of it.3 However, is a broad view of patent
exhaustion necessarily the best approach? Without clearly defining its
limits, patent exhaustion could invariably lead to an unbalanced
marketplace, as patent owners and their downstream purchasers battle
over control rights to patented products.
The Court has failed to articulate a bright-line test for determining
when the transfer of an item from a patent owner to a purchaser triggers
the patent exhaustion doctrine. Notably, the question remains as to
whether a patent owner may impose restrictions or conditions through
licenses or other notices at the time of sale. Furthermore, when and to
what extent a patent owner may use contract law to limit patent
exhaustion remains unsettled. Determining the limits of patent
exhaustion is important to not only protect patent owners, but also to
ensure equity and fairness in the marketplace. Thus, a reasonableness
inquiry may be beneficial to help maintain sound public policy and
prevent patentees from either overextending their monopoly rights, or
obtaining windfall judgments on infringement actions.

II. THE HISTORY OF PATENT EXHAUSTION
The patent exhaustion doctrine terminates a patentee's right to brinq
a patent infringement suit against a purchaser of the patented invention.
Otherwise, a patentee would ordinarily be able to sue another for
making, using, selling, or offering to sell their patented invention.
Thus, an alleged infringer's best defense might be to rely on the patent
exhaustion doctrine to show that a previously authorized sale of the
patented invention effectively ended all of the patentee's rights to it.6
The patent exhaustion doctrine strikes a balance between rewarding a
patent owner and utilizing the patent owner's invention for the benefit

2.

Id. See also KETH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL

EcONoMY 210 (Institute for International Economics 2000) (The patent exhaustion doctrine is
often used interchangeably with the first-sale doctrine, which terminates a patent owner's rights
when a user resells the patented invention).
3. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 533 U.S. 617, 621, 625, 637 (2008).
4. Erin Julia Daida Austin, Note, Reconciling the Patent Exhaustion and Conditional
Sale Doctrines in Light of Quanta Computer v. LG Electronics, 30 CARDozo L. REV. 2947, 2959
(2009).
5. Id. at 2954.
6. Id.
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of society. 7 This is because it gives buyers the right to use a purchased
invention freely while also allowing inventors to market and sell their
creations as they desire. 8
A. The Supreme Court's Precedent
In Bloomer v. McQuewan, an early Supreme Court case from the
nineteenth-century that addressed the patent exhaustion doctrine, the
Court established that a first sale by a patentee exhausted his right to sue
a purchaser for infringement. 9 However, the Supreme Court's reasoning
for this seems more theoretical than practical. For instance, the Court's
motivation for patent exhaustion stemmed from an apprehension about
attaching permanent restrictions to personal property, combined with a
desire to discourage patentees from receiving unwarranted
compensation.o In Adams v. Burke, the Supreme Court revisited the
topic of patent exhaustion, and more clearly described its application:
"When the patentee, or the person having his rights, sells a machine or
instrument whose sole value is in its use, he receives the consideration
for its use and he parts with the right to restrict that use."" This holding
further clarified the Supreme Court's reasoning that the patent
exhaustion doctrine is based on the idea that the patentee should be
fairly compensated for having disclosed the invention after the first
authorized sale.12 Accordingly, patent exhaustion can help safeguard the
public interest in the patent system by controlling a patent owner's
rights. "

In the early twentieth-century, the Supreme Court once again relied
on the patent exhaustion doctrine in Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co. to demonstrate that patentees could not tie the
sale of an unpatented product to the use of their patented inventions. 14
In this case, a film projector was sold with a license that restricted its
use to projection films made by the patent owner.' 5 The Supreme Court
7. Curtis R. Wright, Note and Comment, Quanta of Solace?: The Patent Exhaustion
Doctrine and Method Patents After Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 30 U. LA
VERNE L. REv. 494, 516 (2009).
8. Id.
9. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 552-54 (1852).
10. Andrew T. Dufresne, Note, The Exhaustion Doctrine Revived? Assessing the Scope
and Possible Effects of the Supreme Court's Quanta Decision, 24 BERKELEY TEcH. L.J. 11, 13
(2009).
11. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453,456 (1873).
12. Austin, supra note 4, at 2955.
13. Dufresne, supra note 10, at 14.
14. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 513-15 (1917).
15. James W. Beard, The Limits of Licensing: Quanta v. LGE and the New Doctrine of
Simultaneous Exhaustion, 2008 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 3, 11 (2008).
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reasoned that such restrictions should be derived from contract law as
opposed to patent law because of the cost, inconvenience, and
annoyance to the public that restrictive licenses on unconditional sales
would create.1 6 However, it was not until United States v. Univis Lens
Co. that the Supreme Court attempted to create a bright-line test for
patent exhaustion.' 7 At issue in this case was whether a patentee's rights
in a patented finished product could be exhausted from an authorized
sale of an unpatented article used in the manufacturing of the finished
product.' 8
Specifically, the Supreme Court questioned whether a patentee
selling unfinished lens blanks-that would eventually be used as lenses
in prescription eyeglasses-could impose resale price restrictions on
purchasers who would be responsible for phrsically grinding and
polishing the blanks to create the finished lenses. 9 The Court ruled that
a sale of the unpatented article exhausted the patentee's control rights in
the patented finished product because the unpatented articles embodied
the essential features of the patented finished product, and their sole
purpose was for manufacturing the finished patented product. 20 This
holding effectively enlarged the scope of the patent exhaustion doctrine
by establishing a two-pronp test for determining when a patentee's
rights may be exhausted.2 Specifically, the authorized sale of an
unpatented article may exhaust a patentee's patent rights if the articles
1) embody the essential features of the patents, and 2) had no other
utility than for use with the patent.22 Therefore, application of the
doctrine requires a determination of whether an unconditional and
authorized sale of a patented invention embodied at least the essential
inventive features of the patent. 23 When these stipulations are met, such

16. Id.
17. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942) (noting that the doctrine of
patent exhaustion provides that the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent
rights in that item).
The patentee may surrender his monopoly in whole by the sale of his patent or
in part by the sale of an article embodying the invention. His monopoly remains
so long as he retains the ownership of the patented article. But sale of it
exhausts the monopoly in that article and the patentee may not thereafter, by
virtue of his patent, control the use or disposition of the article.
Id. at 250.
18. Austin, supra note 4, at 2958-59.
19. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. at 244.
20. Id. at 249.
21. Austin, supra note 4, at 2959.
22. Id
23. Id.
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a sale of the patented invention cannot be the subject of a patent
*
24
infringement
suit.
Still, exceptions embedded into Supreme Court precedent have
allowed patent owners to exercise a limited continuing control over
their patented goods. For example, the Court has recognized the
viability of incorporating both use restrictions and price restrictions on
licensees. Specifically, in General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western
Electric Co., the Supreme Court held that patent owners could grant
restricted licenses to manufacturers and enforce the restrictions against
the licensee's purchasers through infringement suits. 25 Here, the patent
owner licensed another company to make and sell its patented
product-sound amplifier tubes.2 6 However, the license stipulated that
such a sale was only meant for private, noncommercial use and wherein
a notice of this restriction was attached to each tube sold.21 Even so, the
licensee sold the goods to a commercial user, and was consequently
found liable for patent infringement.28 The Supreme Court expressed
that a patent owner has the power to restrict their licensees to a
particular use of the licensed invention as long the scope of the patent is
not extended. 29 These field-of-use restrictions essentially limit the use
of a patented invention to a specified market or for a particular
*30
application.
Furthermore, in United States v. General Electric Co., General
Electric licensed a distributor to make, use, and sell its patented light
bulbs at specific prices. 3 1 The Supreme Court suggested that a patent
owner should have the power to control the price that its licensee may
sell their patented invention, because this price influences what the
patent owner can charge. 32 Imposing such price restrictions on licensed
sellers can help maintain the appeal of an incentive-driven patent
system by protecting profit margins of patent owners. 33 Another way
that the Supreme Court has allowed patent owners to retain control
rights over their patented goods is by imposing restrictions on
purchasers. For example, in General Talking Pictures, license
restriction applied to purchasers of the patented tubes as well as to the
licensees. 34 Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit's approach to patent
24. Id.

25. Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181 (1938).
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id at 180-81.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 181-82.
Id. at 181.
Austin, supra note 4, at 2960.
United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 479 (1926).
Id. at 490.
Dufresne, supra note 10, at 17.
Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181-82 (1938).
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exhaustion expanded many of these Supreme Court holdings by paving
the way for use restrictions to be instituted in license agreements with
purchasers.
B. The FederalCircuit'sApproach
The concept of how conditional sales affect a patentee's rights was
explored by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., in which a single-use restriction
was held to be a valid condition." In this case, Mallinckrodt owned a
patent on an apparatus that delivered radioactive or therapeutic material
in aerosol mist form to the lungs of a patient for diagnosing and treating
pulmonary disease.3 6 Mallinckrodt manufactured the device and sold it
to hospitals as a unitary kit that included a nebulizer, manifold, filter,
tubing, mouthpiece, and nose clip.3 7 The device had patent and
trademark distinctions inscribed on it as well as an inscription that
indicated it was for "single use only." Additionally, a package insert
also stated "for single patient use only" and instructed that the entire
contaminated apparatus should be disposed of as biohazardous waste
after use. 39 Instead, the hospitals shipped the used manifold/nebulizer
assemblies to Medipart, who then made sure they were cleaned via
gamma radiation and checked for damage. 40 Each assembly was then
packed with a new filter, tubing, mouthpiece and nose clip, and sent
back to the hospital from which they came as reconditioned units ready
to be reused. 4 '
Mallinckrodt filed suit against Medipart, asserting patent
infringement. 42 However, the district court held that the "single use
only" restriction could not be enforced by a suit for patent
infringement. 4 3 The district court also held that Medipart's actions
constituted permissible repair as opposed to impermissible
reconstruction of the patented apparatus, and further enjoined
Mallinckrodt from distributing a new notice to its hospital customers
Accordingly,
emphasizing the "single use only" restriction."

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 701 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Id.
Id. at 702.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Mallinckrodt appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
investigated three main issues.4 5
The first issue that the Federal Circuit looked at was whether there
was a valid restriction on reuse of the patented device. 46 Mallinckrodt
argued that a restriction on reuse was valid because of the presence of a
"single use only" label license, and that patent law dictates that such a
restriction is valid since it is within the scope of the patent grant.47
Specifically, Mallinckrodt alleged that a license directed to less than all
uses of a patented invention is valid under patent law because it does
not violate any antitrust or patent misuse laws.48 Mallinckrodt also
argued that the restriction was reasonable since it was based on health
and safety concerns and therefore did not violate public policy. 49
Medipart, on the other hand, argued that the restriction was
unenforceable under the patent exhaustion doctrine, since after a
patented article is sold, the patentee has effectively exhausted his right
to control that article's use by the purchaser.o
However, the Federal Circuit pointed out that the practice of
granting licenses for restricted uses is generally permissible, and held
that the principle of patent exhaustion does not make a conditional sale
into an unconditional one. 5 ' Additionally, the Federal Circuit
highlighted that Mallinckrodt committed no antitrust or patent misuse
violations since there was no accompanying price-fixing or forced
product tie-ins. 52 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the district
court and found that Mallinckrodt's restriction on reuse was within the
scope of the patent grant, or at least reasonably justified.53 Therefore,
Mallinckrodt's "single use" restriction should be enforceable by means
of patent infringement.54
The second issue that the Federal Circuit addressed was whether
Medipart's reuse of the device was considered repair or
reconstruction.5 5 Generally, a purchaser's right to use a patented device
does not extend to its reconstruction, which is viewed as if a new device
was constructed. 56 Repairing a patented device, however, is permissible

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 703.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 704-06.
Id. at 708.
Id. at 709.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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under patent law.57 Medipart argued that it only cleaned the assemblies
and replaced minor components thereof.58 The Federal Circuit vacated
the district court's decision that Medipart's actions were permissible
repair since any reuse would be unlicensed and infringed if
Mallinckrodt's "single use" stipulation was held to be a valid license, as
it was here.5 9 Accordingly, deciding between repair and reconstruction
in this case was moot.6 0
The last issue that the Federal Circuit addressed was whether there
was a valid injunction against Mallinckrodt that prevented the
distribution of new notices to hospital users indicating that the device
was for "single use only." 61 Medipart argued that Mallinckrodt's
motivation for wantina a "single use only" license was purely for
However, the Federal Circuit found that
commercial purposes.
Mallinckrodt's alleged infringement against Medipart was not in bad
faith, and thus, the injunction was vacated. 63 Subsequent Federal Circuit
and district court decisions have relied on the holding in Mallinckrodtto
permit restricted licenses and conditional sales from preventing the
exhaustion of patent rights.6 4 Specifically, the Federal Circuit concluded
that patent exhaustion applies only where 1) the sale of a patented
invention includes no explicit conditions, or 2) the condition violates
another law or public policy, such as having an anti-competitive effect
under antitrust policy. s Thus, the Federal Circuit's approach to patent
exhaustion expanded the area of post-sale restrictions on purchasers of
patented products since the presumption was that such provisions would
be binding as long as they adhered to the original scope of the patent.66

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 710.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp., 123 F.3d 1445,
1455 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that there was no infringement when a company refilled patented
printer cartridges because the doctrine of patent exhaustion applied); Ariz. Cartridge
Remanufacturers Ass'n v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1045 (N.D. Cal. 2003)
(finding that no patent exhaustion applied where a patentee validly conditioned the sale of its
patented ink cartridges according to a purchasers' implicit agreement to return the used
cartridges back only to the patentee), aff'd, Ariz. Cartridge Remanufacturers Ass'n, Inc. v.
Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 421 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2005).
65. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 701 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
66. Dufresne, supra note 10, at 22.
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C. The Supreme Court Chimes Back In
However, the Supreme Court once again returned to its own patent
exhaustion analysis in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.67
Respondent, LG Electronics (LGE), purchased a portfolio of computer
technology patents which were licensed to Intel Corporation (Intel) via
a cross-licensing agreement (License Agreement) which allowed Intel
to manufacture and sell microprocessors and chipsets that use the LGE
patents in their own products. 6 Further, a separate agreement (Master
Agreement) between LGE and Intel stipulated that Intel would notify its
own customers in writing that any product purchased therefrom is
licensed from LGE and, therefore, does not infringe any LGE patent. 69
This Master Agreement also set forth that Intel must inform its
customers that the license did not extend to any product made by
combining their own product with an Intel product. 0 After receiving
proper notice from Intel regarding the aforementioned license as
required by the Master Agreement, Appellant, Quanta Computer
(Quanta), nonetheless purchased microprocessors and chipsets from
Intel, and manufactured and sold finished computers that combined
non-Intel systems with unmodified Intel components.7 1 LGE
consequently filed a complaint asserting that Quanta infringed their
patents on the premise that Quanta's combination of Intel components
with non-Intel components to build their computer systems did not fall
within the provisions of their license agreement. 72
The district court held that the license that LGE granted to Intel
resulted in the forfeiture of any potential infringement action because
the authorized sale of the Intel products properly exhausted any patent
rights in Quanta's final product. 73 Accordingly, Quanta was granted
summary judgment.7 4 Additionally, the court explained that patent
exhaustion applies only to apparatus or composition of matter claims
and not to method claims, which were the basis of the LGE patents.7 5
Although the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed that the
doctrine of patent exhaustion does not apply to method claims, it found
that patent exhaustion did not apply to the case at bar, as the products

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 630-35 (2008).
Id. at 623.
Id.
Id. at 623-24.
Id. at 624.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Intel sold to Quanta were not licensed for use in combination with nonIntel products. 6 The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari.
In exploring this case, the Supreme Court found that there was
nothing in the LGE-Intel agreements that restricted Intel's right to sell
its products to those who intended to combine them with non-Intel
Instead, the Court recognized that these agreements ony
parts.
required that Intel provide notice to buyers about its license.
Accordingly, the sale of the Intel microprocessors and chipsets to
Quanta was considered unconditional, and thus applying the patent
exhaustion doctrine would be appropriate.8 0 Additionally, the Supreme
Court established that the doctrine of patent exhaustion should apply to
method patents if 1) the product sold embodies the essential features of
the method; and 2) the product is capable of use only in practicing the
method.
Further, for a component product to embody the essential features of
a method patent per this rule, it must encompass all inventive processes
described in the patent. 82 Thus, in Quanta, the essential features of the
LGE method patents were embodied in the Intel products and the
remaining components needed to complete the computer systems were
merely standard parts. 83 The Supreme Court also reviewed whether the
Intel products could only be used to practice the LGE method patents. 84
The Court held that Intel's component parts substantially embodied the
LGE patents since they included no non-infringing uses and had all the
features of the patented methods.8 5 Consequently, LGE's method patent
rights ended upon the sale of the Intel component parts to Quanta per
patent exhaustion.86
D. Modern Day PatentExhaustion
While exploring LGE's argument that its agreement with Intel
forced express conditions on the licensed products, the Supreme Court
in Quantafocused much of its attention on contract interpretation.8 7 For
example, the Court interpreted the License and Master Agreements as
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 625.
Id
Id at 636.
Id.
Id. at 638.
Id. at 631-32.
Id. at 634.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 638.
Id.
Dufresne, supra note 10, at 34.
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distinct and independent contracts. 8 The Supreme Court further relied
on the details of these agreements to be determinative in its finding that
LGE authorized Intel to sell the licensed products free of restrictions,
regardless of the notice of restrictions that Intel provided to
purchasers. 9 Thus, the doctrine of patent exhaustion prevented LGE
from enforcing its patent rights because Intel was authorized to sell its
products to Quanta.90 However, the Court's decision here hinged firmly
on the specific facts of this case-namely the precise transactions
between all three parties involved. 9 ' Because Intel's sale of components
to Quanta did not constitute a breach of the LGE-Intel licensing
agreement, which allowed Intel to sell its components in combination
with non-Intel parts, the Intel-Quanta sale was presumably
unconditional and authorized.9 2 Although these circumstances triggered
the patent exhaustion doctrine, it is not clear as to what exactly
constitutes an authorized sale according to the Supreme Court. If there
had been a breach of the LGE-Intel agreement, the authority of Intel's
sale to Quanta would have relied on how Quanta subsequently used the
components. 93 Moreover, the Intel-Quanta sale would be unauthorized
if Quanta combined them with non-Intel parts, thus bypassing patent
exhaustion and preserving LGE's right to sue Quanta for

infringement. 94
The patent exhaustion doctrine would likely be marginalized if
method claims continued to be exempt from patent exhaustion because
almost every apparatus patent can be drafted in the form of method
claims. 95 Applicants would therefore be able to avoid exhaustion merely
by choosin to represent their invention as a method as opposed to an
apparatus.9 In this sense, patent drafters could evade patent exhaustion
merely by drafting an apparatus claim in the form of a method for its
use, even though both types of claims would be substantively
indistinguishable. Thus, the patent exhaustion doctrine would be
undermined if method claims were excluded from it because choosing
88. Id.
89. Quanta Computer, Inc., 553 U.S. at 637.
90. Id.
91. Dufresne, supra note 10, at 34.
92. Quanta Computer, Inc., 553 U.S. at 636-37 ("Intel's authority to sell its products
embodying the LGE Patents was not conditioned on the notice or on Quanta's decision to abide
by LGE's directions in that notice.").
93. Austin, supra note 4, at 2981.

94. Id.
95. See John R. Thomas, Of Text, Technique, and the Tangible: DraftingPatent Claims

Around PatentRules, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER& INFO. L. 219, 252 (1998) ("Even the most
novice claims drafter would encounter scant difficulty in converting a patent claim from artifact
to technique and back again.").
96. Id. at 220.
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whether to represent an invention as an apparatus or a method would
merely be a matter of preference.9 7 Furthermore, whereas patent
infringement cases involving method claims prior to Quanta required
some sort of unauthorized use to be actionable, plaintiffs now only have
to show that the alleged infringement was an embodiment of the
essential features of the patent. As a result, defendants may avoid
liability by showing that any operative step of the method they
employed is not a substantial embodiment of the essential features of
the patent.99
The Supreme Court in Quanta relied on the two-prong test
established in Univis Lens for determining whether the sale of
incomplete products could trigger the patent exhaustion doctrine. 00
Specifically, the Court held that incomplete products can trigger patent
exhaustion when their only reasonable use is in practicing the patent at
issue. 01 Furthermore, the Court in Quanta asserted that although the
Intel computer chips required extraneous components to fully function
as intended, the final step of attaching the computer chip is irrelevant
since it is common and non-inventive. o2 By reaffirming the prior twopronged test from Univis Lens, the Supreme Court likely shifted
attention to the novelty aspect of the test-such as determining what
embodies the essential features of the patent. As a result, patent owners
may be influenced to hold back any "inventive finishing processes until
after the first sale [of their invention] as a way to perpetuate control
over incomplete products." 03
III. OBSTACLES TO DEFINING THE LIMITS OF PATENT EXHAUSTION

Although the Supreme Court in Quanta posited that the patent
exhaustion doctrine terminates a patent owner's rights in his patent after
an initial authorized sale,' 04 it is not entirely clear what constitutes such
an authorized sale. For example, a patentee who utilizes a "single use
only" label on a product to create an implied license with a purchaserwho in turn sells the product to another downstream buyer-should be
able to sue both the original and downstream purchaser for
97. Quanta Computer, Inc., 553 U.S. at 629.
98. Id. at 638.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 631; United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 243-44 (1942).
101. Quanta Computer, Inc., 553 U.S. at 632 ("LGE has suggested no reasonable use for
the Intel products other than incorporating them into computer systems that practice the LGE
Patents.").
102. Id. at 633-34.
103. Dufresne, supra note 10, at 32.
104. Quanta Computer,Inc., 553 U.S. at 635-37.
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infringement. This is because the sale by an intermediary licensee to a
downstream purchaser violates the imposed implied license and should
therefore be unauthorized. 05 However, merely placing a label on a
product may not clearly define the bounds of the restriction in regard to
what is considered a valid single use.1 06 Hence, determining the
conditionality of a sale is the first step in determining whether a sale
was indeed authorized.1 0 7
It would seem as though patent licensors would have proper
motivation for dividing their compensation between both licensed
manufacturers and purchasers so that large manufacturing licensees do
not hold all of the bargaining power in a transaction. 8 In Quanta,
Intel's authorized sales exhausted LGE's patent rights, and LGE was
effectively precluded from collecting royalties from Quanta.109 Thus,
whether patentees can split their compensation between licensees and
downstream purchasers is a crucial element that arises from the failure
to limit how the patent exhaustion doctrine treats licensing
restrictions.1 10 Accordingly, a patent owner would want a license
agreement with a manufacturer that limited sales to purchasers who
were explicitly authorized under the license."' By limiting the
manufacturer's sales rights to only designated authorized purchasers,
patentees without a manufacturing ability would still have control over
the initial sale of their patented invention.112 Such an arrangement
would also facilitate an efficient allocation of risks amongst all parties
involved." 3
One way that patent owners can maintain some sort of control or
influence over downstream use of their products is through the use of
conditional licenses.' 14 With conditional licenses, the patent owner
grants only limited rights to a purchaser, while retaining all other
rights. " Accordingly, conditional license rights are immune from
patent exhaustion since a patent owner's remaining rights are not
terminated under the patent exhaustion doctrine.1 16 Furthermore, when
parties agree to conditional licensing provisions, they have a chance to

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
Ill.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Austin, supra note 4, at 2971-73.
Id. at 2971.
Id. at 2979.
Dufresne, supra note 10, at 37.
Id. at 36.
See id. at 12.
Seeid.atl7-18.
See id.at 17-20.
Id. at 38.
Wright, supra note 7, at 514.
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Wright, supra note 7, at 515.
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negotiate a price that is fair for the value conferred." 7 This can limit the
amount of harm upon potential purchasers while still reserving the
opportunity for patent owners to license any remaining rights to
others." 8
The Supreme Court has generally allowed patentees to enforce
conditions on licensed sellers through patent infringement actions." 9
Moreover, restrictions imposed on licensed sellers of atented goods
have been maintained by Supreme Court precedent.12 Although the
Court's opinion in Quanta suggests that LGE has the power to enforce
binding conditions on its licensee, Intel, the Court did not address the
validity of such conditions since the enforceability of license terms was
not ultimately at issue.'21 Thus, it can be inferred that in light of the
Court's decision, a patentee's rights to restrict their licensed vendors
remains. 122
It is important to note that patent owners still have alternative ways
to approach infringement suits against downstream purchasers postQuanta.123 Post-sale restraints on patented goods through principles of
contract law could help diminish the reliance on patent exhaustion and
streamline how a patentee's rights are maintained after the sale of a
patented invention. 24 Relying on the basis of contract law as opposed to
patent law in private dealings would preserve a level of flexibility for
both parties by allowing them to define their preferred protection
criteria, and also restore the patent system's emphasis on fostering
innovation instead of maximizing profit. 25
However, the Supreme Court refrained from stating whether
contractual language could prevent the triggering of the patent
exhaustion doctrine, and if so, what language would be necessary and

117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Dufresne, supra note 10, at 36.
120. E.g., Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181 (1938)
(enforcing a field-of-use license that restricted a licensee's sales to a particular segment of the
market); United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 479, 488 (1926) (influencing a licensed
distributors' pricing of patented light bulbs); Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456-57 (1873)
(licensing sellers to operate in a specific geographic region).
121. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617,636,2121 (2008).
122. Dufresne, supra note 10, at 36.
123. Wright, supra note 7, at 514.
124. Quanta Computer, Inc., 553 U.S. at 638.
125. See Harry First, Controlling the Intellectual Property Grab: Protect Innovation, Not
Innovators, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 365, 390 (2007) ("[A]ntitrust enforcement is necessary to curb the
excessive claims of intellectual property rights holders. It is an antidote to the intellectual
property grab.").
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what surrounding circumstances would be relevant.126 For instance, a
patent owner can demand collateral contracts from the parties seeking to
license their patented methods.127 That way, the patent owner may be
able to bring an action based on breach of contract instead of patent

infringement.12 8
For example, in Quanta, LGE could have required Intel to agree by
contract to make subsequent purchasers pay LGE a fee for use of its
patents in their own non-Intel products.12 Accordingly, Intel would be
liable to LGE for breach of contract if it failed to include such a clause
in its own sales contracts.1 30 The benefit of a contract law approach is
that there are ample checks and balances that do not exist under patent
law. 131 Patent law may serve as a backdoor to allow patent owners a
way to circumvent certain laws such as those governed by antitrust and
equity provisions.' 32 The use of collateral contracts as opposed to patent
rights may allow patent owners to receive their revenues while
maintainin an appropriate balance with purchaser's rights to freedom

of contract.

33

There are also beneficial public policy considerations that come
from allowing patent owners and potential purchasers the freedom to
contract for the right to make, use, or sell patented inventions. For
instance, certain restrictions limit how a product may be used in a
certain field can lead to price discrimination between different target
markets.134 Consequently, new and emerging technologies have the
potential to be more widely circulated when such field-of-use
restrictions are not allowed.13 As such, price negotiations between
parties involved in a transaction may be more streamlined when there is
ample disclosure detailing what a licensee's customers are actually

126. Eileen McDermott, How Quanta Will Change Licensing, MANAGING INTELL. PROP. 1,
2-4 (July 1, 2008), available at http://www.managingip.com/Article/1968339/How-Quanta-willchange-licensing.html.
127. Id at 4.
128. Id.

129. Wright, supra note 7, at 514.
130. Id.
131. John W. Osborne, Justice Breyer's Bicycle and the Ignored Elephant of Patent
Exhaustion: An Avoidable Collision in Quanta v. LGE, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.
245, 258-60 (2008).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 258.
134. William A. Birdwell, Exhaustion of Rights and Patent Licensing Market Restrictions,
60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 203, 226 (1978) (explaining that a goal of field-of-use restrictions is to
separate customer markets so that price discrimination can be exercised in order to take
advantage of varying elasticities of demand).
135. Osborne, supra note 131, at 246 (explaining that allowing field-of-use restrictions is
beneficial since it facilitates efficient dissemination of patented technologies).
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buying, or when each party has a clear understanding of the appropriate
conditions for which the purchased product may be utilized.13
Additionally, patentees may be able to avoid patent exhaustion
simply by designating as a license what is functionally a sale.' 3 7
However, whereas sales create property rights, licenses create relational
interests, and thus they should be treated differently.'3 8 Therefore, the
patent exhaustion doctrine should not apply to licenses to make, use, or
sell patented goods, but instead should only apply to the sale of patented
goods themselves. By relying on principles of contract law, patent
owners are also able to choose what sort of consideration they want to
receive in exchange for their invention. For example, a patent owner
may seek to negotiate a reduced selling price in exchange for a
purchaser's promise of specific post-sale behavior, or they may strictly
want to obtain the largest financial gain possible.' 39 Under patent law
principles, patentees may be overcompensated by more patent rights
that yield added benefits, such as recovery against all downstream
purchasers.140 Thus, enforcing sales conditions through patent
infringement actions may create windfall judgments for patentees that
go beyond some of the public policy justifications for patent rightS.141
Contract law remedies on the other hand would protect a patentee's
negotiated compensation.14 2 Moreover, a typical breach by one party
results in liability up to the other party's reasonable expectations of
complete performance.143 Accordingly, if a party breaches a contractual
promise as part of a purchase that exhausts the patentee's patent rights,
then contract remedies can fulfill the expected compensation, and
therefore preserve the incentive for innovation which underlies the
patent system. 14

IV. HOW THE PATENT EXHAUSTION

DOCTRINE SHOULD BE APPLIED

The guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court in Quanta that
determine whether a sale is satisfactorily authorized such that it triggers
136. Austin, supra note 4, at 2976.
137. Richard H. Stern, The Unobserved Demise of the Exhaustion Doctrine in US Patent
Law, 15 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 460, 465 (1993).

13 8. Id.
139. See B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(expressing that "it is more reasonable to infer that the parties negotiated a price that reflects
only the value of the 'use' rights" determined by the patentee in a conditional sale).
140. Dufresne, supra note 10, at 46.
141. Id. at 47.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 46.
144. Id.
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the patent exhaustion doctrine further requires a determination as to
whether a sale was conditional.145 This serves as another indicator that
the viability of the conditional sales doctrine remains strong postQuanta. Moreover, if determining the conditionality of a sale is treated
like an initial step for solving the authorized first sale inquiry, then a
patent exhaustion analysis consistent with both the patent exhaustion
doctrine and the conditional sale doctrine can be developed.146 In this
sense, neither doctrine is mutually exclusive to the other, but instead can
work in concert to expand a patentee's control rights in his own
invention, while still limiting his ultimate control over downstream
purchasers in the marketplace.
Much of the confusion regarding how far the patent exhaustion
doctrine can stretch stems from the Supreme Court's failure to address
under what circumstances a patentee may impose restrictions or
conditions on a sale such that breach by a purchaser can be considered
patent infringement. Adhering to the Court's decision in Quanta, any
sale authorized by the patent owner will trigger patent exhaustion, thus
limiting their ability to enforce post-sale restrictions. 47 Although the
Court's decision might favor the rights of purchasers over the power of
patent owners to control the downstream use of their inventions, it is
important to resist making the standard for triggering patent exhaustion
too rigid. Specifically, in Quanta, LGE and Intel's notice to purchasers
was not sufficient enough to act either as a license restriction or as a
sale condition to make it unauthorized, thus strengthening the doctrine
of patent exhaustion.148 By ensuring the license is sufficiently broad, a
licensee will be authorized to sell the patented invention, thus triggering
patent exhaustion for the patentee. 14 Therefore, any limiting language
used in license agreements must be carefully examined. Accordingly,
the Supreme Court's holding in Quanta is troublesome because it is
difficult to see how a mere "single use only" stamp on the product in
Mallinckrodt can be enough to establish a sufficient license when the
limitations of the license agreements in Quanta were insufficient to
make the sale of the parts unauthorized for a particular use. so
Giving the patent exhaustion doctrine such broad reach could
seriously hamper patent owners' motivation for involving
intermediaries, such as manufacturers, in their stream of commerce.
145. Austin, supra note 4, at 2978.
146. Id. at 2979.
147. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 636-38 (2008).
148. Jason McCammon, The Validity of Conditional Sales: Competing Views of Patent
Exhaustion in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. Pot'Y 785,
791-92 (2009).
149. Id. at 791.
150. Id. at 793.
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Accordingly, the general guidelines for determining the limits of patent
exhaustion set forth by the Court in Quanta should be followed in order
to reign in the power of patent owners. For example, the patent
exhaustion doctrine should not have such a broad reach that patent
owners become inclined to take on the responsibilities of an
intermediary manufacturer just to ensure control over their inventions.
Such an outcome could start a slippery slope, wherein patent owners
inadvertently extend their monopoly on their patented invention beyond
what patent law principles might have otherwise intended. Conversely,
if the limits of the patent exhaustion doctrine are too narrow, patent
owners would be able to exploit their monopoly powers to collect
royalties at multiple points along the downstream path of its patented
inventions.15 1
Therefore, the patent exhaustion doctrine should encompass some
objective standard, such that a determination of whether a patentee's
conduct triggers the doctrine becomes centered around a basic inquiry
of reasonableness. Thus, the patent exhaustion doctrine's limits hinge
on whether the patent owner's behavior would strain his monopoly
rights in the patented invention. 152 When these rights are unreasonably
overextended, patent exhaustion should be triggered. For example, in
Quanta, if LGE could have altered the wording of its License
Agreement such that it specified the extent of Intel's authority to resell,
and wherein such an agreement would not exceed LGE's monopoly
rights in the patent, then the patent exhaustion doctrine need not apply.
Instead, LGE's detailed license would allow any licensee a fair chance
to agree to its terms and conditions and any problems that might still
arise could then be settled under contract law principles.
Such a reasonableness approach is consistent with the Federal
Circuit's reasoning in Mallinckrodt regarding how sale conditions
should be evaluated. 5 3 Specifically, a patentee has the freedom to
condition a sale as he sees fit unless the imposed conditions violate
some other law or public policy, such as patent misuse or antitrust. 154
This hybrid test will maintain the broad scope for patent exhaustion that
the Supreme Court proposed in Quanta, while also reconizing that not
every transfer will automatically trigger the doctrine.' 5 This way, a
151. Id. at 794.
152. Id.
153. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
154. Id. (concluding that contract law allows a patentee to condition a sale unless such
conditions violate some other law or policy such as patent misuse or antitrust. Therefore, the
court used a reasonableness approach as the standard for determining whether a condition of a
sale is allowable-i.e., a restriction is found reasonable according to the patent grant if "it
relates to subject matter within the scope of the patent claims .....
155. McCammon, supra note 148, at 797.
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conditional sale analysis can be used to complement the determination
of how far the patent exhaustion doctrine should reach. Thus, if a sale is
conditional, then patent exhaustion should be postponed until the
condition is met. Furthermore, if the condition is never satisfied, then
the patentee's rights will not be exhausted. However, the court will need
to examine a purchaser's continuing conduct after a sale from a patentee
in situations where the satisfaction of a condition depends on that
purchaser's post-sale activities.
When applying this test to determine whether a particular case
triggers patent exhaustion, a court's first task should be to interpret the
patentee's sale and licensing agreements. If it is determined that the
patent owner's sale to a purchaser is unrestricted, or that a purchaser's
resale to another downstream purchaser is authorized, then the patent
exhaustion doctrine as set forth in Quanta should apply. However, if the
court finds certain conditions in the license agreement unreasonable in
either granting the patent owner control power beyond normal patent
rights or contradictory to existing laws and public policy, then the court
should also examine what conditions on the sale could limit the scope of
the patent exhaustion doctrine. Otherwise, when the patent exhaustion
doctrine is not triggered, contract law principles should be used to settle
any remaining dispute.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court's recent decision in Quanta helped
broaden the reach of the patent exhaustion doctrine, it avoided many
issues and left many questions unanswered that could have shed further
light on the limits of the doctrine. A revitalization of the patent
exhaustion doctrine will likely act as a useful shield against
infringement claims, but its effectiveness will be diminished if courts
have insufficient guidance to apply the Supreme Court's precedent
correctly and consistently. Determining the limits of patent exhaustion
is important to not only protect patent owners, but also to ensure equity
and fairness in the marketplace. Thus, a reasonableness inquiry may be
beneficial to help maintain sound public policy and prevent patentees
from either overextending their monopoly rights, or obtaining windfall
judgments on infringement actions. Therefore, this analysis should be
accomplished on a case-by-case basis in order to maintain balance in the
marketplace since purchasers of patented products should have a fair
and equitable opportunity to investigate any proposed license agreement
to its fullest.
The availability of contractual remedies for patent holders seeking to
enforce post-sale restrictions on purchasers is a good alternative when
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patent exhaustion is limited or remains unsettled. However, allowing a
patent owner the ability to reach past an initial transaction and control
downstream users and purchasers of patented products is inconsistent
with the principles of contracting since it leads to uncertainty and
unpredictability in the use of products and services. Therefore it is
important to find the right balance between patent law and contract law
by recognizing limits on patent owners' rights, while also leaving room
for contract principles. Consequently, patentees should be alerted to
take great care in their licensing transactions and to be cautious when
relying on patent law remedies to recover from the wrongdoings caused
by a downstream purchaser. Ultimately, these limits of the patent
exhaustion doctrine should serve the interest of the legal community by
requiring clearly drafted contracts and licenses, as well as the general
public by preventing liability for infringement where a patented product
was used for an intended purpose within its scope. Abiding by these
limits will ensure that inventors get their rightful royalties, as opposed
to doubling up on royalty charges, and guarantees that a purchaser's
right to freely use and enjoy their goods is protected under contract,
antitrust, and equity laws.

